Introduction
The increasing marketization of English higher education can be analysed with respect to a numberofdimensions,butatitsheartthepaymentoftuitionfeesbyhome-basedundergraduates loomslarge(sobringingEnglishhighereducationclosertoboththelong-establishedUSmodel andtherecentlyreformedAustraliansystem).Itistheintroductionofvariabletuitionfeesthatis widelyseenasthevitalstepinthemarketizationofEnglishhighereducation (FarrellandTapper, 1992; Brown and Carasso, 2013; McGettigan, 2013; Palfreyman andTapper, 2014) .While the interpretationsofthewidermarketizationofhighereducationarebestdescribedasambivalent, theimpositionofvariabletuitionfeeshasbeenwidelycondemnedandtheissueisstillfarfrom resolved-notethedecisionoftheLabourPartytoincludeinits2015generalelectionmanifesto apromisetoreducethecurrentfeeceilingof£9,000perannumto£6,000(coupledwiththe possibilitythathaditformedthenextgovernment,itwouldhavesoughttoreplacefundingvia income-contingentloanswithagraduatetax).Thisarticleisanopinion/discussionpiecewritten inparttopointoutthepitfallsofsuchamove(nowveryremoteforthenextfiveyears),andto argueforthecontinuation,albeitwithsomeaccompanyingreforms,ofstudenttuitionfeesrepaid throughaschemeofincome-contingentloans.
The coming of variable fees: The interaction of ideological and economic variables
FormuchofthehistoryoftheEnglishuniversities,highereducationpolicyhasbeendrivenbya combinationofideologicalandeconomicpressures.Throughoutmostofthetwentiethcentury, educationwasperceivedasapositivesocialgood,theexpansionofwhichalsoallegedlyenhanced theprogressoftheeconomy.However,muchofthepoliticalsupportforsuchclaimsfocusedupon thestateprovisionoffreeprimaryandsecondaryschooling,reachingitszenithinthepassage ofthe1944EducationAct.Forhighereducationthepoliticalfocuswastruncated-theneedto augmenttherepresentationofstudentsfromworking-classfamiliesandforasystemthatwould be open to all talented individuals regardless of their socio-economic circumstances.To this end,from1918onwardsapatchwork-quiltpatternofsupportforprospectiveundergraduates wasinitiatedbythelocaleducationauthorities,whichstartedtopaytuitionfeesandprovide maintenancegrants,althoughthecostswerereimbursedbytheTreasury.However,followingthe AndersonReport(MinistryofEducation,1960)thesystemwascentralizedandrationalizedas thenationalgovernmentassumeddirectresponsibilityformakingthesepayments. WhileitmayhavebeenfeasibletohaveimposedupontheTreasuryagrowingburdenof publicexpenditure,thisbecameincreasinglyproblematicwhentheexpansionofhighereducation considerablyincreasedthatburden. ItshouldbenotedthatevenLordRobbins(1980) ,whocan beregardedastheideologicalarchitectofthatexpansionofhighereducation,cametorecognize thatcontinuingexpansionshouldbefundedatleastinpartoutofastudentloansschemerather than the public purse. In fact so as not to increase unduly the burden of public expenditure, governmentsbecameincreasinglyparsimoniousintheirfundingofhighereducationexpansion, andhence(althoughtheoverallburdenmayhavecontinuedtorise)expenditureperstudent declinedsharply (GreenawayandHaynes,2000) .Thusinthe1970sand1980suniversitiesturned increasinglytotherecruitmentofoverseasstudents(forwhomtheywererequiredtocharge aneconomicfee)tobalancethebooks.Consequently,theuniversitiesthemselveswerethinking increasingly of alternative ways of funding tuition costs, while operating a lucrative market in internationalstudents-anexperiencetheycoulddrawuponwhenitcametochargingfeesfrom thehomestudentmarket.
These pragmatic economic considerations were steadily reinforced by the growing ideological consensus that the pursuit of higher education enhanced what was essentially a private rather than a public good, and thus it should be paid for by the individual recipient rather than from the public purse. Not surprisingly, such claims gained increasing strength in theyearsofsuccessiveConservativeGovernmentsunderMargaretThatcher,althoughironically, thankstointernalpartydivisions,notoneofhergovernmentssucceededinbringingastudent loansschemetofruition (FarrellandTapper,1992:274-84 (Browne, 2010) . However, this review did not recommend a fees ceiling.As noted, therehasbeenmuchdiscussionofthefeesceilingbeingloweredto£6,000perannum,withthe possibilityofincome-contingentloansbeingreplacedbyagraduatetaxtosecurethenecessary funding (Gill,2015:5) .Thedangerofremovingtheceilingontuitionfeesisthat,withoutaviable accompanyingpolicyonstudentloans,themostexpensiveuniversitieswouldpossiblybeout of the reach of students from poorer families, which would risk creating a division in higher educationtoparalleltheonethatmarkstheprivatesecondarysector,withitsstratumofasmall numberofveryexpensiveschools.
Politics and a possible guiding principle for the financing of tuition fees
Inviewofthestrengthoftheunderlyingideologicalvaluesandthehealthysizeoftheirparliamentary majorities,itisperhapssurprisingthataThatchergovernmentdidnotsucceedinintroducinga studentloansscheme.AlreadyBahramBekhradnia,currentPresidentoftheinfluentialHigher Education Policy Institute, has reportedly called Labour's £6,000 fees announcement'terribly disappointing'and'amouseproducedforelectoralreasons' (Morgan,2015:5) .Inanelaboration ofhisattack,Bekhradniaisreportedtohavesaid:'Thiswouldhavebeentheperfectopportunity for Labour to take a principled stand in favour of direct and substantial taxpayer funding of higher education, balanced by a much-reduced student fee and reduced government subsidy [forfeeloans]' (Morgan,2015:5) .Thisappearstobeapleaforareturntotheproposalsofthe AndersonReport,whichformanywithintheLabourPartywouldbethemostappropriateway forward.Thuswefacethepossibilityofinternalpartymachinationsparalleltothosethatthe parliamentaryConservativePartyexperiencedinthe1980s.
Moreover,beforeattemptingtoenunciateakeyguidingprinciple,itisimportanttonotethat thecontextwithinwhichafuturefundingpolicywillevolveiscriticallydifferentfromthatwhich prevailedwhenthecurrentpolicyunfolded;itwillbestronglyinfluencedbythefactthataloans scheme,invariousguises,hasnowbeeninoperationforovertenyears.Forallitslimitationsit hasstoodthetestoftimeandnowtherearemanywhowouldarguethatitismoreimportant tofocusontheprovisionofmaintenancegrantsthantuitionfees.Thereisawealthofestablished policyknowledgetodrawupon.Firstly,andperhapsmostsurprisingly,istherelativelylimited impactthattheloansschemeshavehaduponstudentparticipationlevels.Thesehaverecovered fromthereductionthatoccurredfollowingtheimpositionofvariablefees(especiallywhenthey wereraisedfromamaximumof£3,000toamaximumof£9,000perannum).Furthermore,it nowalsoappearsthataccessfromthemoresociallydeprivedsectorofsocietyhasincreased ratherthandeclined,althoughthereisstillsomewaytogobeforethereisanythingapproaching parityofaccessacrossallsocialgroups.Howisthissignificantchangetobeaccountedfor?
It was always likely that there would be a period of time before prospective students absorbedtheshockofthechangeinpolicydirection.Moreover,inaperiodofeconomicrecession formany,itmaymakemoresensetocontinueinfull-timeeducationratherthantolookfora job,especiallyasadegreeisstillanecessaryresourceforaccessingprofessionalemployment. Finally, and most critically, under the auspices of the Office for FairAccess (OFFA) it was expectedthattheuniversitieswouldusesome(25to35percent)oftheirfeeincome(between £6,000 and the amount charged) to promote wider access. Consequently, the universities started to compete with one another to offer fee reductions and/or bursaries to applicants fromeconomicallypoorerfamilies.Itmeantthatallstudents,ortheirwell-to-doparents,were providing the resources to secure the fee reductions or bursaries for some, an arrangement thatwasadministeredbytheuniversities,withOFFAapprovingthetermsintheformofaccess agreements.Itmaysoundlikeaverybyzantinesetofarrangements,butitappearstohavehad thedesiredeffectofbalancingsomewhatthesocialintakeofstudentaccesstohighereducation. Itisalmostasifwehavereturnedtothenineteenthcentury,whenaccesstohighereducation bystudentsfrompoorerfamilieswasinvariablydependentuponfinancialsupportprovidedby theuniversity,albeitwitheitherendowmentincomeorthosestudentswhopaidfull-costfees providingthefinancialresources.Moreover,thereisaclearrecognitionthatthetermsgoverning therepaymentofloansarerelativelygenerous:norepaymentuntilincomereaches£21,000per annum,suspensionofrepaymentifincomefallsbelowthatlevel,andcancellationofthedebt30 yearsafterrepaymentcommences.Theinevitableconsequenceisthatanincreasingproportion ofthetotaldebtwillneverberepaid,leavingtheTreasurytomeettheshortfall.Theconsequence isthatthepaymentoftuitionfeesremainsaconsiderableburdenuponpublicexpenditure,which shouldbewelcomedbythosewhobelievethathighereducationisapublicgoodandthusits costsshouldbeunderwrittenbythepublicpurse(althoughtheinclinationistoacknowledgethe ironyofthesituationratherthantowelcomeit).
The second contextual change is that, although there may be a broad acceptance that highereducationisapublicgood,thishasmuchtodowithitsenhancementofknowledgeand promotionofhigh-statusculture,anditdoesnotmeanthatitisnotalsoaprivategoodandthat studentsasitsbeneficiariesshouldnotmeetatleastsomeofitscosts.Certainly,asseeninthe policystanceofUniversitiesUK(UUK)thereisconsiderablesupportforthisviewwithinthe universities(seetheresponseofitsStudentFundingPanelto'thenewIFSreportonstudent funding' -Universities UK, 2015). Moreover, the current funding via income-contingent loans with a high ceiling level gives considerable control to the universities to plan their financial futureswhiledistancingtheprospectofbureaucraticstatedirectionoftheiradmissionspolicies. Ofcourse,thereissomenostalgiainlookingbacktotheimmediatepost-Andersonyears,before thepost-Robbinsexpansiontookoff,andinimaginingthatthestatewillinfuturecontinuously fundhighereducationgenerouslyonanagreedquinquennialbasis.Butpoliticalrealitysuggests thatthisisnotanareaofpublicpolicylikelytobeshelteredpermanentlybecausethedemands of other policy imperatives (for example, health care for the expanding elderly population) have increasingly significant political appeal (for example, consider the 2015 general election manifestos of all the major parties, in which concern for the funding of the National Health Service takes precedence over every other policy).The ideological framework, within which policyispartlyshaped,hasshiftedinadirectionthatmakesthedemandforatleastapartial paymentoffeesbythestudentmoreacceptable.Moreover,itisimportanttopointoutthatthe shifttofundingteachingthroughstudentfeesgivesuniversitiesmorecontrolovertheirown development.Theuniversitiesarenowfunctioninginthecontextofastate-regulatedmarket (Palfreyman andTapper, 2014 ), for we have moved away from a centrally planned system of highereducationinwhichdevelopmentwashighlydependentuponthefundingbodies-firstthe UniversityGrantsCommitteeandsubsequentlythefundingcouncils.
TheLabourParty'sdecisiontocommititselftoloweringthetuitionfeesceilingfrom£9,000 to £6,000 per annum may be interpreted as simply an unsuccessful electoral manoeuvre to enhance its prospects of securing more parliamentary seats. However, it has also added new dimensionstotheargument:firstly,thatpolicyanalysisdoesnotinevitablyhavetobebasedon thepremisethattuitionfeeswillautomaticallyincrease;secondly,thatthereisstilladebatetobe hadaboutthepoliticalrelevanceofhighereducationissues;andthirdly,thatthefuturedirection oftuitionfeespolicystillremainscontentious.
The policy alternatives
In analysing these alternatives we have been guided by the principles implicit in the previous section of this article that the universities should control their own fee levels, which rules outtheloweringofthemaximumfeefrom£9,000to£6,000perannum,andthatagraduate tax should replace income-contingent loans. Either of these moves would leave the funding of higher education to the vagaries of public expenditure and vulnerable to the shortfalls in fundingthatoccurredinthe1970sand1980s.Suchmovescouldalsogivethestatepotential controlovertheadmissionsprocess,perhapsevenimpactingupontheacademicprofileofthe universitybychoosingtofundonlythosestudentswhoselecttostudycertainacademicoptions, aswassuggestedbybothPlaidCymruandUKIPintheir2015electionmanifestos.Thereare alsopossibleacademicramificationsinreplacingincome-contingentloanswithagraduatetax, although the costs (and assumed benefits) are mainly political and have to be borne by the governmentthatenactsthepertinentlegislation.Alreadywehaveanincreaseinapplicationsto overseasuniversitiesinresponsetotheimpositionofhighfeesandthiscouldbeintensifiedif thosewhohavegraduatedfromanEnglishuniversityhavetopayagraduatetaxthroughouttheir workinglivestofinancefuturetuitionfees.Alsoasanearmarkedtaxthiswouldrunintostrong opposition from theTreasury, which has always opposed such hypothecated taxation.When variabletuitionfeeswerefirstintroducedtherewasconsiderablesupport(ledinparticularby theLSEeconomistNicholasBarr-seeBarrandCrawford,2005:101-19)fortheideathatthey shouldbeunderwrittenbyagovernment-financedschemeofincome-contingentloans,which wasstronglyfavouredoverproposalsforagraduatetax:sowhyshouldanincominggovernment gooverthesameterritoryagain? Ifthereisnopossibilitythatintheageofcostlymasshighereducationweareeverlikely toseeareturntothefull andcontinuouspublic fundingof higher education tuition fees(as occurredwhenonlyaround15percentofthe18-21cohortwereinhighereducation),and giventhatfinancingthroughagraduatetaxislikelytoembroilanygovernmentinaprotracted periodofpoliticalturmoilwhilethreateninguniversitieswithalossofcontroloverhowthey conducttheiraffairs,thentheonlyreformpackagethatseemstomakesenseistochangethe prevailingmodelofincome-contingentloans.Theoverallpurposeofthereformwouldbe:(1)to enableuniversitiestoexercisemaximumcontrolovertheirtuitionfeespolicy;(2)tocontrolthe burdenthattheschemeimposesuponpublicexpenditure;and(3)toprovidestudentswithmore choiceintheselectionoftheirdegreeprogrammesandgreaterprotectionfromlaxuniversity standardsoncetheyhavecommencedacourse.Atthemomenttheonerealconstraintonthe level of fees that higher education institutions can impose for UK/EU undergraduates is the ceilingof£9,000perannum.AsrecommendedbytheBrowneReviewthisshouldberemoved, anduniversitiesempoweredtosettheirownfeelevels.Thiswouldundoubtedlyresultinawider variationoffeelevels,andhelptokeephighereducationoutofthepoliticallimelightbymaking feeincreasesaninstitutionalratherthanagovernmentresponsibility.Thefinancialobligations incurredbythestatethroughthecurrentincome-contingentloansschemecouldbemitigated intwodifferentways.Firstly,bytighteninguptheconditionsofrepayment:settingrepayment atasteeperrate,withpositiveincentivesofferedforearlyrepayment,andrepaymentextended overalongerperiodoftimeifnecessary.Secondly,theStudentLoansCompanycouldlimitthe amountthatcouldbeborrowedbyeachstudent,perhapsto£6,000perannum.Thehopewould bethatsuchamove,combinedwithplacingresponsibilityforfeeincreasesupontheuniversities, wouldpersuadeuniversitiestomoderatetheirfeelevels.Theuniversitiesthemselvescouldbe responsibleforfindingthenecessaryresourcestobridgethefundinggap(between£6,000and thefee).Thiswouldentailtheuniversitiesmakingdealswithfinancialinstitutions,whichshould provetoberelativelystraightforwardforuniversitiesthatcoulddemonstratethattheirstudents invariablygraduatedandfoundfinanciallyrewardingjobs.Wherethiswasnotpossible,perhaps the university should consider whether it should offer such a course, or whether it should loweritsfeelevel.Universitiesshouldalsoberequiredtoprovidemoreinformationonhow theydeterminetheirfeelevelsandshouldbemoreopentoprovidingredresstostudentswhen theyfeeltheyhavenotbeengiventhestandardofeducationthattheyfelttheywerepurchasing. Universitiesshouldalsoberequiredtodemonstratetheiracademiccredibilityandnotsimply asserttheircontrolofthecurriculumastheirdefence.Thechangestrategyistoincreaseboth the power of the state and the power of the student market -to create a state-regulated marketthatisincreasinglyattunedtoprovidinghigh-qualityhighereducationinthecontextofa universitysystemthatisincreasinglydifferentiatedinternallywithrespecttothegoalsitpursues. Whatisrequiredisacompetitivemarket,andtohelpestablishthatmarketthestatenotonly needstoregulatethewayinwhichhighereducationprovidersmaketheirservicesavailable,but alsomustensurethatthereisasteadyincreaseinthenumberofuniversitiesofferinghigh-quality degree programmes, with regulation ensured by a combination of inspections by the Quality AssuranceAgency(QAA)andthepublicizingofthefindingsoftheNationalStudentSurveys (NSS),alongwiththecreationofanewregulator-anOfficeforHigherEducationorOfficefor TertiaryEducation.And,asthestateretreatsfromdirectlyfinancingastudent'shighereducation, ithastotakeonagreaterburdenofensuringconsumerprotectionforthestudent-customer payinghighfees.
So action is pursued on three fronts: (1) to introduce technical changes to the current student loans scheme that will lessen its dependence upon the public purse (even possibly makingtheuniversitiesassumetheresponsibilityforraisingfinancialsupportforatleastpartof thecostsoftuitionfees);(2)torequiretheuniversitiestoassumegreaterresponsibilityforthe academicqualityoftheprogrammestheyoffer;and(3)topermit,througharegulatedprocess of access, more institutional providers to enter the market in order to increase institutional competition and student choice.Although we are not going to return to a system of higher educationinwhichstudentaccessisoverwhelminglypubliclyfinanced,wecanconstructamodel inwhichthereisamoreequitablesharingofthecostsoftuitionandinwhichstudentscanbe better assured that they receive quality higher education (while the universities retain more controlovertheirownaffairs).
Post-2015 general election prognosis
FollowingtheelectionoftheConservativeGovernmentatthe2015generalelection,various developmentscanbeforeseen.Theceilingonfeesmayberemovedandthehighereducation institutionslefttosettheirownfeelevels,includingpotentiallyraisingthemabovethecurrent ceiling of £9,000 per annum.There will be a tightening of the terms of loan repayments -a higherrateofrepaymentandanextensionofthelengthoftimeduringwhichrepaymentcanbe claimed,combinedwithdiscountsforthosewhopayearly.Therewillbenoearlymovetowards curtailingtheamountthatthestateispreparedtooffertosupportthepaymentoftuitionfees, butthiswillbesetdownasamedium-termpolicyobjective,anduniversitieswillhavetostart preparationsforraisingfundingtoenabletheirstudentstopaytheirtuitionfees.Theinstitutions willoffermorebursariesandfeereductionstostudents,whichmaybedirectedspecificallyat students opting to study particular (perhaps undersubscribed) courses or who are deemed tobepotentialhigh-flyers. Overtimemoreproviderswillenterthehighereducationmarket, and in (OxfordUniversityPress, 2014) .DavidistheHonoraryTreasurerandaTrusteeoftheSocietyforResearchintoHigherEducation (SRHE),andwasaTrusteeofthe Harpur Trust(alsoknownastheBedfordCharity)fortwentyyears.
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